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ABSTRACT:
An efficient allocation of resources between the public and the private sectors of an
economy requires that both the revenue burden and the expenditure benefit are fully
noticeable by final taxpayers and public services consumers. For many and complex reasons
this visibility is defective in OECD countries. From a technical point of view it is necessary to
find indicators to quantify how well this principle is reached, at any moment, by local,
intermediate, central or federal and supranational government levels.
This paper presents results and conclusions obtained by its author at the Public
Finance and Public Sector Economics Research Unit, of University of Valencia, by
developing a permanent research line - initially financed by the Inter-ministerial Commission
for Science and Technology of the Spanish State - concerning a) the definition of visibility of
public expenditure benefit in an operational way, b) the identification of relevant factors
generating problems of invisibility of public expenditure, and c) the construction of indicators
to carry out historical and international comparisons. In addition to this, new estimates
relating to the European Union member countries are offered by using statistical data and
information from the International Monetary Fund, with conclusions and comments for future
prospects as regards the convergence characteristics required for the public expenditure
systems of such countries.2
1. INTRODUCTION
Improvements in the efficient allocation of resources between the private and public
sectors of an economy - as well as among its several public sub-sectors - can be reached
insofar as both public revenue and expenditure possess visibility, that is to say, the burden of
public revenue and the benefit of public expenditure should be fully noticeable by individuals
1.
Concerning public revenue, this property of visibility has changed in the course of
history, depending on both economic (as the development level of a country) and political (as
mechanisms of fiscal illusion used by politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups to overcome
taxpayers' resistance) factors [Wagner, 1976; Borcherding, 1977; Buchanan and Wagner,
1977; Fiorina and Noll, 1978; Pommerehne and Schneider, 1978; Brennan and Buchanan,
1980; Frey and Pommerehne, 1982; Oates, 1988; Tullock, 1989; Tabellini and Alesina, 1990;
Dunleavy, 1991; Mueller, 1993; Roig-Alonso, 1998]. In a similar way, the compliance with
such required property by fiscal systems now in force might differ remarkably among OECD
countries.
With regard to public expenditure, the final or intermediate, the public or private
nature, the spacial effects or dimensions, the administration costs, and other inherent
characteristics of publicly provided goods and services represent major factors determining
their benefit visibility [Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen, 1981; Solano, 1983; Hamilton, 1983;
Becker, 1983, 1985; Mueller and Murell, 1985, 1986; Mueller, 1987; Wolff, 1987;
Henrekson, 1992].
In any case, it is convenient to dispose of logical and general indicators permitting the
measuring, as exactly as possible, of the extent to which the required property of visibility is
achieved at all times by local, state, federal or confederal, supranational, and general fiscal
sub-systems and systems of countries.
This contribution presents results and conclusions concerning:
A) The definition of visibility of public expenditure benefit in an operational way.
B) The identification of relevant factors generating problems of invisibility of public
expenditure.
C) The construction of indicators to carry out historical and international comparisons.
In addition to this, new estimates relating to the European Union member countries
are offered by using statistical data and information from the International Monetary Fund,
with conclusions and comments for future prospects as regards the convergence
characteristics required for the public expenditure systems of such countries.
A policy implication of these estimates is confirmed: allocation improvements could
be obtained in these European countries by implementing changes and reforms aiming to raise
the current values of public revenue and expenditure visibility.3
2. INDEX OF BURDEN VISIBILITY OF TOTAL PUBLIC REVENUE
In general, for every level, L, of territorial public administrations of an economy, a
visibility index, VL
R, of its total public revenue, R, can be defined in such a way that 0 £ £ VL
R
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where:
a) n = number of types of public revenue R for level L of territorial public administrations;
b) xiL
R = relative financial weight of public revenue R of type i for level L of territorial public
administrations, with i = 1, 2, ..., n; that is to say:












R = absolute quantity of public revenue R of type i for level L of territorial public
administrations;
c) yiL
R = visibility or perceptibility (for the policy intended - or legal - revenue-provider)
factor of burden of public revenue R of type i to which level L of territorial public
administrations is entitled, with 0 £ £ yiL
R £ £ 1.
3. BURDEN VISIBILITY OF A SPECIFIC PUBLIC REVENUE
An objective estimate of yiL
R - factor of perceptibility of the direct burden by a policy
intended - or legal - revenue-provider of a public revenue R of type i for level L of territorial










R = voluntary (viL
R = 0) or coercive (viL
R = 1) nature of public revenue R of type i for its
policy intended - or legal - revenue-provider (coerciveness parameter), with 0 £ £ viL
R £ £ 1.
b) piL
R = full (piL
R = 0) or null (piL
R = 1) proportionality of the quantity of public revenue R
of type i - the burden of which is borne by a policy intended - or legal - revenue-provider - to
the cost of efficiently producing the good or service specifically received by him in return for
his burden (proportionality parameter), with 0 £ £ piL
R £ £ 1.4
c) miL
R = full (miL
R = 1) or null (miL
R = 0) information to the policy intended - or legal -
revenue-provider on the concept of the direct burden he is bearing when providing public
revenue R of type i (concept-information parameter), with 0 £ £ miL
R £ £ 1.
d) qiL
R = full (qiL
R = 1) or null (qiL
R = 0) information to the policy intended - or legal -
revenue-provider on the quantity of the direct burden he is bearing when providing public
revenue R of type i (quantity-information parameter), with 0 £ £ qiL
R £ £ 1.
e) iiL
R = intermediate (iiL
R = 0) or final (iiL
R = 1) position of the policy intended - or legal -
revenue-provider in relation to his direct burden (burden-shifting parameter), with 0 £ £ iiL
R £ £
1.








R are continuous variables
ranging from 0 to 1, i and L are subscripts for the type of revenue and level of territorial
public administration respectively and R is a superscript - non an exponent - for public
revenue.
4. INDEX OF BENEFIT VISIBILITY OF TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
The social benefit of a publicly supplied good or service is equal to its social
production cost when these four conditions are simultaneously met:
A) Resources of an economy are Pareto-efficiently allocated in both public and private sectors
and sub-sectors.
B) Private and public production of goods and services of such an economy is technically
efficient (which means that minimum inputs are used to reach a pre-determined mix of
outputs, or, alternatively, that maximum outputs can be obtained out of a pre-determined mix
of inputs).
C) Production is made at constant returns to scale.
D) There is no consumer surplus.
When one or several of the previous conditions are not kept, the social cost of
publicly supplying a good or service has to be corrected upward or downward in order for it
to approximate its social benefit in money terms.
In any case, it is possible to consider the accounting production cost of a publicly
supplied good or service as a first estimate of its social benefit in money terms, trying to
identify final beneficiaries by applying a set of imputation criteria according to the economic
nature of every type of good or service. In such a case, we should remember that every
publicly supplied good or service can be:
A) Public (rival consumption is null), private (rival consumption is full), or mixed (rival
consumption is partial).5
B) Intermediate (production resource) or final (consumption resource).
Besides, a final good or service can be complementary, substitute, or independent in
relation to the available personal income of a final consumer, and its re-distributive incidence
will be regressive, progressive, or proportional. According to income-elasticities of demand,
publicly supplied substitute goods are inferior (negative coefficient), whereas complementary
goods are normal (positive coefficient).
In most cases a policy intended - or legal - consumer or user is quite aware of his
personal benefit from a publicly supplied private good (for instance, a money grant), has an
incomplete notion of the social benefit from a mixed good (like an education or health
service), and fails to properly perceive the social benefit of a public good (defense, law and
order, etc.). So, he faces important difficulties for assessing, in money terms, the social benefit
- and even the countable cost - from many publicly supplied goods and services.
Usually, the problem of evaluating benefits of public supplied goods and services
turns out to be complicated because the following considerations have to be taken into
account:
A) Many types of publicly supplied services (complex goods) simultaneously have a)
intermediate and final, b) public and private, c) substitute and complementary components,
and these different parts are to be identified, characterized, and measured in separate ways.
B) The number and variety of types of publicly supplied goods and services is greater than
that corresponding to types of public revenue.
C) A good or service can be supplied by a level of territorial public administration out of
funds collected and granted by another level of territorial public administration.
Similarly to the case of public revenue, for every level of territorial public
administrations, L, a general index, VL
E, of benefit visibility of total public expenditure, E, can
be defined in such a way that 0 £ £ VL
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where:
a) q = number of types of public expenditure E performed by level L of territorial public
administrations;
b) xfL
E = relative financial weight of public expenditure E of type f performed by level L of
territorial public administrations, with f = 1, 2, ..., q; that is to say:6












E = absolute quantity of public expenditure E of type f performed by level L of
territorial public administrations;
c) yfL
E = visibility or perceptibility (by the policy intended - or legal - consumer) factor of
benefit of public expenditure E of type f performed by level L of territorial public
administrations, where 0 £ £ yfL
E £ £ 1.
5. BENEFIT VISIBILITY OF A SPECIFIC PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
An objective estimate of yfL
E (factor of perceptibility by a policy intended - or legal -
consumer of the direct benefit of a public expenditure E of type f performed by level L of










E = null (vfL
E = 0) or full (vfL
E = 1) consumption of a publicly supplied good of type f by
its policy intended - or legal - user or beneficiary (consumption parameter), with 0 £ £ vfL
E £ £ 1.
b) pfL
E = full (pfL
E = 0) or null (pfL
E = 1) proportionality of cost of efficient production of the
publicly supplied good of type f to a specifically requited monetary burden borne by the
policy intended - or legal - user or beneficiary (proportionality parameter), with 0 £ £ pfL
E £ £ 1.
c) mfL
E = full (mfL
E = 1) or null (mfL
E = 0) information to the policy intended - or legal -
consumer or user on the concept of the direct benefit he is receiving when public expenditure
E of type f is being performed (concept-information parameter), with 0 £ £ mfL
E £ £ 1.
d) qfL
E = full (qfL
E = 1) or null (qfL
E = 0) information to the policy intended - or legal -
consumer or user on the quantity of the direct benefit he is receiving when public expenditure
E of type f is performed (quantity-information parameter), with 0 £ £ qfL
E £ £ 1.
e) ifL
E = intermediate (ifL
E = 0) or final (ifL
E = 1) position of the policy intended - or legal -
user or beneficiary of the publicly supplied good of type f in relation to his direct benefit
(benefit-shifting parameter), with 0 £ £ ifL
E £ £ 1.









E are continuous variables always ranging from 0 to 1, f and L are subscripts for
the type of public expenditure and level of territorial public administration respectively and E
is a superscript - non an exponent - for public expenditure.7
6. ESTIMATES ON BURDEN VISIBILITY OF TOTAL PUBLIC REVENUE
Table 2 presents estimates on burden visibility of public revenue and grants of the
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previously defined, to fiscal central sub-systems now in force in these countries.
Such values have been calculated mainly from information and primary data on public
cash flows provided by both the Commission of the European Communities
2, reflecting tax
structures of - and the institutional situation in - every member country on January 1, 1992,
and the International Monetary Fund
3.
To obtain a sensitivity analysis, three hypotheses on minimum, plausible and
maximum shifting of tax burden have been assumed, giving rise to the corresponding series of
maximum, VM, plausible, Vp, and minimum, Vm, values of weighted-visibility estimates of
revenue burden for policy intended - or legal - revenue-providers. The initial values for the
fiscal visibility parameters v, p, m, q, iM, ip, im - shown in Table 1 - have been deducted and
imputed after carefully analysing all the information provided by both the International
Monetary Fund and the Commission of the European Communities on the internal structure
of each type of public revenue.
As regards results, according to Table 2, presenting Vp visibility estimates of revenue
and grants for the European Union member countries, Finland, with a value of 49.19%, has
the most visible central sub-system, Greece having the least visible one, with 25.74%.
TABLE 1
Values Imputed to Fiscal Visibility Parameters
(approximate average values)
Public Revenue Concepts v p m q iM ip im
1. Income, profits, capital gains taxes
1.1. Individual 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50
1.2. Corporate 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00
1.3. Other unallocable taxes 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.62 0.25
2. Social security contributions
2.1. Employees 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50
2.2. Employers 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00
2.3. Self-employed or non-employed 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.008
2.4. Other unallocable contributions 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00
3. Taxes on payroll and work force 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50
4. Taxes on property
4.1. Recurrent on immovable property 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50
4.2. Recurrent on net wealth
4.2.1. Individual 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50
4.2.2. Corporate 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00
4.3. Estate, inheritance, gift taxes 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50
4.4. Financial and capital transactions 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00
4.5. Nonrecurrent taxes on property 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00
4.6. Other recurrent taxes on property 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50
5. Domestic taxes on good and
services
5.1. General sales and value-added 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.87 0.75
5.2. Excises 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.87 0.75
5.3. Profits of fiscal monopolies 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.87 0.75
5.4. Taxes on specific services 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.87 0.75
5.5. Taxes on use of goods or
activities
5.5.1. Business/professional licenses 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00
5.5.2. Motor vehicle taxes 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50
5.5.3. Other taxes on use of goods 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50
5.6. Other taxes on goods and
services
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00
6. Taxes on international trade
6.1. Import duties
6.1.1. Customs duties 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.50
6.1.2. Other import charges 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.50
6.2. Export duties 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.50
6.3. Profits export/import monopolies 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.50
6.4. Exchange profits 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.509
6.5. Exchange rates 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50
6.6. Other taxes on international trade 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.00
7. Other taxes
7.1. Poll taxes 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50
7.2. Stamp taxes 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00
7.3. Taxes not elsewhere classified 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00
8. Entrepreneurial and property
income
8.1. Cash operating surpluses 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
8.2. From public financial institutions 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
8.3. Other property income 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
9. Administrative fees and charges 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00
10. Fines and forfeits 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50
11. Contributions to government
employee pensions
11.1. Employees 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50
11.2. Employer 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00
12. Other nontax revenue 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.00
13. Sales on fixed capital assets 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
14. Sales of stocks 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
15. Sales of land and intangible assets 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
16. Capital transfers from
nongovernmental sector
16.1. From residents 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
16.2. From abroad 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
17. Grants from abroad
17.1. Current 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
17.2. Capital 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
18. Grants from other levels of
national government
18.1. Current 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.0010
18.2. Capital 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
19. Grants from supranational
authorities to member countries
19.1. Current 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
19.2. Capital 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
20. Grants to supranational authorities
20.1. Current 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
20.2. Capital 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
DEFICIT 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Notes for table 1:
v = degree of coercion of public revenue for its legal provider.
p = degree of specific requital of public revenue for its legal provider.
m = degree of information on the public revenue concept for its legal provider.
q = degree of information on the public revenue quantity for its legal provider.
iM = maximum incidence of the direct monetary burden onto the legal provider of public
revenue.
ip = plausible incidence of the direct monetary burden onto the legal provider of public
revenue.
im = minimum incidence of the direct monetary burden onto the legal provider of public
revenue.
Source: own elaboration from data on Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1994,
volume XVIII, International Monetary Fund, Washington, 1994.
TABLE 2
Estimates of Public Revenue Visibility in the European Union: Consolidated
Central Government Level
Member countries / Years VM Vp Vm
Austria, 1992 62.92% 42.93% 22,95%
Belgium, 1992 68.87% 46.72% 24.57%
Denmark, 1993 62.79% 46.76% 30.74%
Finland, 1990 66.70% 49.19% 31.68%
France, 1992 65.60% 43.51% 21.42%
Germany, 1992 56.28% 37.08% 17.88%
Greece, 1993 32.49% 25.74% 18.98%11
Ireland, 1991 64.17% 46.01% 27.86%
Italy, 1993 57.45% 39.53% 21.61%
Luxembourg, 1991 56.22% 37.81% 19.41%
Netherlands, 1993 66.60% 47.33% 28.05%
Portugal, 1989 53.67% 36.57% 19.46%
Spain, 1991 66.88% 43.09% 19.30%
Sweden, 1992 65.51% 40.62% 15.73%
United Kingdom, 1992 63.68% 45.49% 27.31%
Footnotes for table 2:
VM = maximum visibility estimates of revenue burden for the legal revenue provider.
Vp = plausible visibility estimates of revenue burden for the legal revenue provider.
Vm = minimum visibility estimates of revenue burden for the legal revenue provider.
- = non-existing government level for the year considered.
... = datum lacking for the year considered.
Source: own elaboration from data in Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1994, volume
XVIII, International Monetary Fund, Washington, 1994.
7. ESTIMATES ON BENEFIT VISIBILITY OF TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
In turn, table 4 presents estimates on benefit visibility of public expenditure and grants
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to the consolidated central fiscal sub-systems in these European Union countries. Such values
have been calculated mainly from information and primary data on public cash flows provided
by the International Monetary Fund
4.
As before, three hypotheses on minimum, plausible and maximum shifting of
expenditure benefit have been assumed to obtain a sensitivity analysis, giving rise to the
corresponding series of maximum, VM, plausible, Vp, and minimum, Vm, values of weighted-
visibility estimates of expenditure benefit for the policy intended - or legal - beneficiary of
every type of good and service publicly provided. The initial approximate values for the fiscal
visibility parameters v, p, m, q, iM, ip, im - now shown in Table 3 - have been deducted and
imputed after carefully analysing all the information facilitated by the International Monetary
Fund on the internal structure of each type of public expenditure.12
As regards plausible results, according to Table 4, presenting Vp visibility estimates of
expenditure, Austria, with a value of 34.15%, has the most visible central sub-system,
Portugal having the least visible one, with 26.02%.
TABLE 3
Values Imputed to Fiscal Visibility Parameters of Public Expenditure
(approximate average values)
Public Expenditure Concepts v p m q iM ip im
1. General public services
1.1. Executive and legislative organs,
financial and fiscal affairs, external
affairs other than foreign aid
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
1.2. Foreign economic aid 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
1.3. Fundamental research affairs and
services 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.50 0.25
1.4. General services 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
1.5. General public services not
elsewhere classified 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
2. Defense affairs and services
2.1. Military and civil defense
administration and operation 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
2.2. Foreign military aid 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
2.3. Defense-related applied research
and experimental development
1.00 1.00 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.50 0.25
2.4. Defense affairs not elsewhere
classified 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
3. Public order and safety affairs
3.1. Police and fire protection 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
3.2. Law courts 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
3.3. Prison administration and
operation 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
3.4. Public order and safety affairs not13
elsewhere classified 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
4. Education affairs and services
4.1. Pre-primary and primary
education affairs and services 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
4.2. Secondary education affairs and
services 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
4.3. Tertiary education affairs and
services 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
4.4. Education services not definable
by level 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
4.5. Subsidiary services to education
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
4.6. Education affairs and services not
elsewhere classified 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
5. Health affairs and services
5.1. Hospital affairs and services 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 0.50
5.2. Clinics, and medical, dental, and
paramedical practitioners 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 0.50
5.3. Public health affairs and serv. 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 0.50
5.4. Medicaments, prostheses, medical
equipment and appliances, or other
prescribed health-related products
1.00 0.75 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 0.50
5.5. Applied research and
experimental development related to
the health and medical delivery system
1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.75 0.50
5.6. Health affairs and services not
elsewhere classified 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 0.50
6. Social security and welfare affairs
and services
6.1. Social security affairs and
services 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.75 0.50
6.2. Welfare affairs and services 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00
6.3. Social security and welfare affairs14
not elsewhere classified 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 0.50
7. Housing and community amenity
affairs and services
7.1. Housing and community
development 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 0.50
7.2. Water supply affairs and services
1.00 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 0.50
7.3. Sanitary affairs and services
including pollution abatement and
control 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 0.50
7.4. Street lighting affairs and services
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 0.50
7.5. Housing and community amenity
affairs and services not elsewhere
classified 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 0.50
8. Recreational, cultural affairs
8.0. Recreational, cultural, and
religious affairs and services 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 0.50
9. Fuel and energy affairs and services
9.1. Fuel affairs and services 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
9.2. Electricity and other energy
sources 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
9.3. Fuel and energy affairs and
services not elsewhere classified 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
10. Agriculture, forestry, fishing. and
hunting affairs and services
10.1. Agriculture affairs and services
1.00 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
10.2. Forestry affairs and services 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
10.3. Fishing and hunting affairs and
services 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
10.4. Agricultural research and
experimental development not
elsewhere classified 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
10.5. Agriculture, forestry, fishing,
and hunting affairs and services not15
elsewhere classified 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
11. Mining and mineral resource
affairs and services, other than fuels;
manufacturing affairs and services;
and construction affairs and services
11.1. Mining and mineral resource
affairs and services, other than fuels
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
11.2. Manufacturing affairs and
services 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
11.3. Construction affairs and services
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
11.4. Mining and mineral resource
affairs and services not elsewhere
classified; manufacturing affairs and
services not elsewhere classified; and
construction affairs and services not
elsewhere classified
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
12. Transportation and
communication affairs and services
12.1. Road transport affairs and
services 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
12.2. Water transport affairs and
services 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
12.3. Railway affairs and services 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 0.75 0.50 0.25
12.4. Air transport affairs and services
national government 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.75 0.75 0.50 0.25
12.5. Pipeline transport and other
transport system affairs and services
1.00 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
12.6. Transportation system affairs
and services not elsewhere classified
1.00 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
12.7. Communication affairs and
services 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.75 0.75 0.50 0.25
12.8. Transportation and
communication affairs and services16
not elsewhere classified 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 0.75 0.50 0.25
13. Other economic affairs and
services
13.1. Distribution trade affairs and
services including storage and
warehousing; hotel and restaurant
affairs and services 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
13.2. Tourism affairs and services 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 0.50
13.3. Multipurpose development
project affairs and services 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
13.4. General economic and
commercial affairs other than general
labour affairs 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
13.5. General labour affairs and
services 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
13.6. Other economic affairs and
services not elsewhere classified 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
14. Expenditures not classified by
major group
14.0. Expenditures not classified by
major group 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25
Notes for table 3:
v = degree of consumption of a publicly supplied good by the policy-intended or legal
beneficiary.
p = degree of proportional cost of the efficient production of the publicly supplied good to a
specifically requited monetary burden born by the policy-intended or legal beneficiary.
m = degree of information to the policy-intended or legal beneficiary on the concept of the
direct benefit he is receiving when public expenditure is being performed.
q = degree of information to the policy-intended or legal beneficiary on the quantity of the
direct benefit he is receiving when public expenditure is being performed.
iM = maximum incidence of the direct monetary benefit onto the policy-intended or legal
beneficiary of a publicly supplied good.
ip = plausible incidence of the direct monetary benefit onto the policy-intended or legal
beneficiary of a publicly supplied good.
im = minimum incidence of the direct monetary benefit onto the policy-intended or legal
beneficiary of a publicly supplied good.
Source: own elaboration from A Manual on Government Finance Statistics, International
Monetary Fund, Washington, 1986, and Roig-Alonso, 1989.17
TABLE 4
Estimates of Public Expenditure Visibility in European Union member countries:
Consolidated Central Government Level
Member countries / Years VM Vp Vm
Austria, 1995 44.25% 34.15% 24.07%
Belgium, 1988 40.30% 30.52% 20.63%
Denmark, 1995 40.88% 31.01% 21.33%
Finland, 1995 38.39% 28.76% 19.79%
France, 1993 41.35% 31.92% 18.17%
Germany, 1991 43.99% 33.85% 23.79%
Greece, 1995 37.60% 26.90% 16.29%
Ireland, 1994 37.99% 28.22% 18.47%
Italy, 1988 39.29% 29.73% 20.20%
Luxembourg, 1995 42.39% 32.85% 23.33%
Netherlands, 1996 40.85% 30.91% 21.15%
Portugal, 1988 35.46% 26.02% 16.58%
Spain, 1994 41.00% 30.80% 20.61%
Sweden, 1996 42.90% 33.05% 23.23%
United Kingdom, 1995 39.40% 29.43% 19.48%
Notes for table 4:
VM = maximum visibility estimates of expenditure benefit for the policy-intended or legal
beneficiary.
Vp = plausible visibility estimates of expenditure benefit for the policy-intended or legal
beneficiary.
Vm = minimum visibility estimates of expenditure benefit for the policy-intended or legal
beneficiary.
Source: own elaboration from data in Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1997,
International Monetary Fund, Washington, 1997.
8. CONCLUSIONS
The quality of public revenue and expenditure sub-systems and systems as policy18
instruments for efficiently allocating economic resources among private and public sectors
and sub-sectors varies as a result of economic, political, and social factors.
The indices of fiscal visibility previously defined bring forward a general measurement
methodology which can be used to make relevant quantified comparisons among member
countries of the International Monetary Fund provided that detailed statistic figures on
execution of public budgets as well as information about the nature of the different types of
public administrations' revenue and expenditure programmes are available to researchers.
Estimates obtained from different assumptions on tax and expenditure shifting by
applying these indices to measure the visibility of revenue burden and expenditure benefit of
central sub-systems now in force in the European Union member countries show:
First.- Low values of burden visibility for all these countries in general, especially for Greece.
Such general low values of revenue visibility stem from the concurrence of several factors
such as non-coerciveness, non-existence of specific requitals, lack of information on concepts
and quantities, partial shifting of burden by tax-payers, intergovernmental grants, etc.
Second.- Still lower values of benefit visibility for the same countries, specially for Portugal,
Greece, Ireland, Finland, United Kingdom and Italy.
Third.- The burden visibility is higher than the benefit visibility in all countries excepting
Greece, so that for central level governments in such countries there is a tendency to under-
provide goods and services publicly. On the contrary, the burden visibility is similar to the
benefit visibility for Greece.
Fourth.- Policy implications of these estimates seem straightforward for all these European
countries: as both present revenue and benefit visibility are low in general, allocation
improvements could be obtained by implementing changes and reforms to raise values in
general and by approaching these two types of budget visibility.
FOOTNOTES
1By revenue visibility we mean visibility of direct burden of public revenue. Some types of
public revenue (for instance, revenue from public property) do not involve any burden in the
strict sense here reserved for this term. Symmetrically, by public expenditure visibility,
visibility of direct benefit of public expenditure must be understood. Again, some types of
public expenditure (for example, public purchases of private financial assets at market prices)
might not carry any benefit with them.
2Inventory of Taxes Levied in the Member States of the European Communities, 15th edition,
Commission of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1993.
3A Manual on Government Finance Statistics, International Monetary Fund, Washington,
1986, and Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1994, volume XVIII, International
Monetary Fund, Washington, 1994.19
4A Manual on Government Finance Statistics, International Monetary Fund, Washington,
1986.
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